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As the UK economic downturn accelerates, the government is trying to devise a 
policy response to slow and eventually reverse the contraction. The Monetary Policy 
Committee has made a contribution by cutting interest rates drastically, sending the 
sterling exchange rate to an all time low against the euro. Many commentators are 
now also advocating fiscal policy action in the form of tax cuts or higher expenditure.  
 
This raises three questions. First, can the UK afford a fiscal stimulus, given that the 
budget deficit is already 3 per cent of GDP? Second, would a fiscal stimulus be 
effective? Third, how should any such stimulus should be designed? Is a tax cut better 
than a boost in expenditure? If so, which taxes should be cut? This note addresses 
these questions, drawing on recent contributions from academic research. 
 
 
 
Is a fiscal stimulus affordable? 
 
Our view is that a fiscal stimulus is affordable and would be effective if designed 
properly. It is affordable despite the fact that the current government deficit is high, 
and must be corrected at some point. Figure 1 shows that the current deficit in the UK 
is already high relative to other countries. And in the first half of 2008-9, UK public 
sector net borrowing was £37.6 billion, 75% higher than the same period last year. 
This is likely to rise still further, as tax revenues fall and expenditure on benefits 
rises.2  
 
                                                 
1 Michael Devereux is Director, and Clemens Fuest is Research Director, of the Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation.  
2 For example, in 2007/8, the financial sector contributed over a quarter of the £46 billion collected in 
corporation tax. This is likely to fall substantially, although there is as yet no indication of this in 
corporation tax receipts. A fall should be expected in the October 2008 receipts, although these have 
not yet been published. 
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Figure 1 
Government borrowing in the UK and Germany, 1991-2008 
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However, as Figure 2 shows, UK government debt as a percentage of GDP is 
relatively low, both by historical and international standards. At just under 38%3 it is 
much lower than most other European countries. Japan’s debt exceeds 150% of its 
GDP. In asking whether the UK can afford a fiscal stimulus, it is more reasonable to 
focus on this overall stock of debt than on the new borrowing in any particular year 
since it is the stock which determines both the soundness of government finances in 
the UK and the need for corrective action in the future.  
 
Some commentators argue that the government´s recent capital injections to UK 
banks may be a threat to fiscal sustainability. But whether these injections will be a 
burden to the taxpayer is an open question. In the long term, the value of the assets 
acquired may also be higher than the cost. Current market valuations of financial 
instruments such as credit default swaps do not indicate that financial markets are 
concerned about the soundness of UK government finances. Of course, this doesn’t 
mean that the long term stock of debt should rise: but given the rapid slowdown in the 
economy at present the UK is in a good position to support a temporary rise in the 
debt to GDP ratio.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Excluding Northern Rock; including Northern Rock the figure is 43.4%, still considerably lower than 
other countries.  
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Figure 2 
International comparison of stock of Government Debt, 1991-2008 
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Would a fiscal stimulus be effective? 
 
But even if the UK can afford a fiscal stimulus, would it be effective? Economic 
research has moved on from the simple Keynesian analysis that a budget deficit 
would stimulate the economy. Recent research has focused on the conditions under 
which a fiscal stimulus or a fiscal contraction would stimulate the economy. This 
indicates that there may be circumstances in which a fiscal stimulus would reduce 
economic activity, and a fiscal contraction expand it.4  
 
However, under current conditions there are two broad reasons to expect that a fiscal 
stimulus would help to slow the downturn. First, the relatively low level of 
government debt itself will help. A fiscal stimulus in a highly indebted economy may 
raise concerns amongst consumers and investors about government solvency and lead 
them to spend even less; but this is unlikely to be a problem in the UK at present. 
Second, the effects of fiscal policies on consumer spending have proved to be stronger 
in recessions than in booms because people are more likely to be credit constrained.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See, for example, A. Alesina and S. Ardagna (1998) “Tales of fiscal adjustment”, Economic Policy, 
13, 487-545. 
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How should a fiscal stimulus be designed? 
 
The effectiveness of a fiscal stimulus package depends, though, on how it is designed. 
We propose a package with three elements: 
 
1. An increase in the Child and Working Tax Credits. 
2. The introduction of accelerated depreciation allowances for one year. 
3. An increase in government spending on infrastructure projects. 
 
These three elements aim at increasing aggregate demand for goods and services by 
private households, investors and the public sector itself. This package addresses the 
main components of aggregate demand: consumption, investment and government 
spending.  
 
Stimulating aggregate household consumption faces at least four problems. First, the 
share of private consumption in GDP in the UK has been unusually high in the last 
few years. Figure 3 shows household consumption expenditure rose from just under 
90% of real disposable income in the mid 1990s to close to 100% in the early part of 
this year. Such consumption levels are not sustainable. So, while consumption is 
likely anyway to fall sharply, some correction is needed.  
 
Figure 3 
UK household final consumption expenditure as percentage of real disposable 
income, 1985-2008 
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Second, not all households react to a tax cut by spending more. In the current 
economic situation, many may just increase their savings. Given this, it is important to 
target households who would spend more if their disposable income increased now. 
Low income households are most likely to do so. Third, even where there is more 
spending, this may partly be spent on imports of goods and services. This reduces the 
effect of the stimulus on the UK economy, and highlights the benefits of international 
cooperation. Fourth, given that the fiscal stimulus is intended to be temporary, and 
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that the aim would be eventually to maintain the current overall stock of debt, then 
forward-looking households may not respond strongly, believing that their long term 
position is barely affected. This suggests targeting measures aimed at consumption to 
those who are more likely to face credit constraints.  
 
These considerations lead us to propose that a significant part of the package should 
be used to boost the Child Tax Credit (CTC) and the Working Tax Credit (WTC). In 
April 2008, just over 6 million families were in receipt of one or both of these, at a 
total cost of just under £20 billion. These credits are targeted primarily to lower-paid 
workers, although CTC is also available to out-of-work families. It seems appropriate 
to target relief to such families, not just because they are likely to suffer more heavily 
from the economic downturn, but because they are likely to spend a higher proportion 
of the additional income. There would therefore be a greater impact on aggregate 
consumption than cuts in other taxes, such as VAT or income tax.  
 
It is worth briefly comparing this measure to that recently proposed by the 
Conservative Party. The Conservatives propose to offer credits against employers’ 
national insurance contributions to employers that hire new workers who have been 
unemployed for three months or more. The cost is intended to be met by savings from 
unemployment benefits, and so it is argued would not represent a fiscal stimulus. In 
some ways increasing the WTC is a similar proposal in that resources would be 
targeted towards low-paid employees. But offering support only for hiring the 
unemployed creates no incentives for firms to hold on to existing workers, and 
introduces the need for rules to prevent firms sacking workers and hiring new ones. 
The two schemes also differ in that the immediate impact of an increase in the WTC 
would be captured by the employee rather than by the employer.5  
 
The second element of our package is to introduce accelerated depreciation 
allowances for a temporary period of probably a year. The introduction of accelerated 
depreciation would create a strong incentive for investment. Businesses are currently 
postponing or abandoning investment projects because of the gloomy economic 
situation. Higher allowances would help to make these projects economic. But 
because the incentive would be available only for a fixed period, businesses would 
also have a considerable incentive to bring forward investment projects. There is 
considerable empirical evidence that the timing of investment expenditure responds 
significantly to announcements of temporary measures such as this.6 One objection to 
this incentive could be that loss-making firms would not be able to benefit from 
accelerated depreciation because they do not pay corporation tax. This could be 
addressed by allowing loss-making businesses to claim an equivalent credit in 
exchange for the accelerated depreciation.  
 
One caveat to introducing even temporary measures to boost investment is that there 
would be a deadweight loss. That is, investment which would have taken place in any 
case would still receive the accelerated allowance. This reduces the impact of each £1 
                                                 
5 In the long run, it is possible that wages would adjust so that this distinction becomes unimportant; 
but to the extent that wages are reduced as a result of higher credit being paid, then at least that would 
help to boost the demand for labour. 
6 For example, evidence from the USA of the strong effects of the bonus depreciation allowance passed 
in 2002 and increased in 2003 is given in C. House and M. Shapiro “Temporary Investment Tax 
Incentives: Theory With Evidence from Bonus Depreciation”, NBER Working Paper 12514.  
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of foregone tax revenue. In principle it would be possible to mitigate this by offering 
the additional allowances for investment only above some baseline – such as level in 
the previous accounting year. However, that would introduce considerable 
complication and would be likely to lead to a smaller overall effect. We therefore 
propose that it be applied to all investment, and believe that the impact of a temporary 
measure would be large enough to justify the cost.  
 
The third element of the package would be an increase in funds available for public 
investment. Public investment projects have to be planned carefully to be productive, 
and increasing demand does not mean that the government should waste money. 
Expanding public investment in the short term is therefore difficult. But at present the 
temptation is to cut back on public investment projects, for example, those for the 
2012 Olympics. This should not happen. Another option trailed recently has been the 
possibility of increasing subsidies for insulation. Like the measure for investment, this 
would be more effective in the short term if it was announced as a temporary measure.  
 
 
 
The overall impact  
 
How large would the effect of these measures be on GDP? Of course that depends on 
the size of the measures themselves. But the effect can be measured in terms of 
multipliers. For example, a multiplier of two would imply that £1 of additional 
government spending would increase GDP by £2. Estimates of these multipliers vary, 
but a broad consensus of economic research suggests that we unfortunately cannot 
expect the multiplier to be much more than one. A multiplier of one would imply that 
a fiscal stimulus package of, for example, £ 30 billion – about 2% of GDP - would 
increase GDP by no more than this. But adding 2% to GDP in the coming year would 
be a significant success and would improve the basis for a subsequent recovery.      
 
